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IMMATERIAL TO INNOVATION:   
THE STORY OF ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS, 
INC. V. ELI LILLY & CO. 
INTRODUCTION 
One of the crucial goals of the patent system is to promote 
technological advancements.1 This is especially true in the biomedical 
sciences field as new insights lead to advancements in diagnosis and 
treatments.2 This goal of innovation is affected by the “scope” of patents, 
and many theories have been put forth on the optimal scope.3 
The written description requirement in federal patent law4 serves as one 
possible check on patent scope. A hotly debated topic both in the Federal 
Circuit5 and academia,6 this requirement faced its greatest challenge in 
Ariad Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., a case involving a 
biotechnology patent.7 After initially holding that the plaintiffs’ broad 
claims were invalid because the written description inadequately supported 
them,8 the Federal Circuit vacated the opinion and granted their petition for 
rehearing en banc.9 Among the issues that the court wanted to address was 
“[w]hether 35 U.S.C. § 112, paragraph 1, contains a written description 
                                                                                                                                
 1. Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic Perspectives on 
Innovation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 803, 808 (1988). 
 2. See Chester J. Shiu, Of Mice and Men: Why an Anticommons Has Not Emerged in the 
Biotechnology Realm, 17 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 413, 442 (2009). 
 3. See David E. Adelman, A Fallacy of the Commons in Biotech Patent Policy, 20 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 985, 987 (2005). 
 4. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006) (“The specification shall contain a written description of the 
invention . . . .”). See also discussion infra Part II.B. 
 5. See Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., 
concurring). 
 6. See Shengfeng Chen, Note, Pathways to Patents: Applying the Written Description 
Requirement Doctrine to Patents on Biological Pathways, 30 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 559, 
562 (2008) (arguing that the written description doctrine can serve as an effective check against 
broad patents on research tools); Wenrong Huang, Note, Enzo’s Written Description Requirement: 
Can It Be An Effective Check Against Overly Broad Biotechnology Claims?, 16 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 1, 4 (2006) (arguing that the loosened written description standard after Enzo does not 
provide enough protection for broad patent claims and that the standard should be returned to the 
way it was articulated in Eli Lilly); William C. Mull, Note, Using the Written Description 
Requirement to Limit Broad Patent Scope, Allow Competition, and Encourage Innovation in 
Biotechnology, 14 HEALTH MATRIX 393, 396 (2004) (arguing that the written description 
requirement is being correctly applied by the Federal Circuit); Guang Ming Whitley, Note, A 
Patent Doctrine without Bounds: The “Extended” Written Description Requirement, 71 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 617, 619 (2004) (asserting that the written restriction requirement gives too much 
discretionary power to the judges); David A. Gay & Astrid R. Spain, Rochester Decision 
Exacerbates the Written Description Threat to Biotechnology Inventors, I.P. LITIGATOR, 
May/June 2005, at 6 (criticizing the written description requirement and its negative effect on 
certainty involving the validity of patents). 
 7. Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1369–71. 
 8. Id. at 1380. 
 9. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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requirement separate from an enablement requirement?”10 While the 
rehearing could have eliminated the written description requirement, some 
commentators’ fears over its possible demise11 have been assuaged because 
the Federal Circuit decided to uphold it in its recent opinion.12 However, 
other commentators’ might not be excited about this development,13 
especially since it has been argued that the Court failed to provide much 
guidance in its opinion.14 
This note argues that, while some check on patent scope is necessary, 
biotechnology companies and universities have effective resources and 
measures in place to promote and enhance innovation, and to adapt to 
change. Therefore, while Ariad might not have adequately clarified how the 
written description requirement should be applied, the opinion will have 
little effect on innovation. In the past, companies have developed strategies 
in the face of exclusive patent rights that have allowed them to continue 
their research.15 These strategies will continue to be successful in the future 
if the companies accept that there is a separate written description 
requirement and follow the United States Patent and Trademark Office’s 
examining procedure regarding it. Additionally, the enablement 
requirement on its own is an effective measure to limit the broadest patents 
like Ariad’s, so upholding the written description requirement was not 
necessary to promote innovation.  
Part I of the note gives a brief overview of various theories on patent 
scope and the effects of claim drafting on innovation. Part II provides a 
background on the written description requirement, and compares it to the 
enablement requirement. Part III uses this background to explore Ariad and 
to demonstrate that the enablement requirement is an effective check on the 
broadest patents. Lastly, Part IV analyzes the strategies utilized by 
companies and universities that allow them to continue with their research 
in the face of patents. These inspired maneuvers will prevent innovation 
from being stymied even in light of the Federal Circuit’s continued reliance 
on the written description requirement. 
                                                                                                                                
 10. Id. 
 11. See Huang, supra note 6; Chen, supra note 6. 
 12. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 13. See Gay & Spain, supra note 6; Whitley, supra note 6. 
 14. Howard Skaist, Guest Post: Ariad  v. Lily: Choosing to Not Disrupt the Settled 
Expectations of the Patent Community, PATENTLY-O (Mar. 28, 2010, 10:46 PM), 
http://www.patentlyo.com/patent/2010/03/guest-post-ariad-v-lily-choosing-to-not-disrupt-the-
settled-expectations-of-the-patent-community.html. 
 15. John P. Walsh et al., Effects of Research Tool Patents and Licensing on Biomedical 
Innovation, in PATENTS IN THE KNOWLEDGE-BASED ECONOMY 285, 322, 324 (Wesley M. Cohen 
& Stephen A. Merrill eds., 2003) (arguing that companies and universities have the ability to 
license, “invent around” patents, or ignore patents). 
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I. SCOPE OF PATENTS AND POSSIBLE EFFECTS ON 
INNOVATION—VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL 
POLICY 
A primary concern with the written description requirement is its 
possible effects on innovation.16 Since one of the purposes of the patent 
system is “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,”17 and 
patent scope in general has been connected with innovation,18 it is crucial to 
analyze the effectiveness of this requirement while paying close attention to 
its possible influence on how technology develops.19 The claims set out in a 
patent application determine the scope of the invention and “distinguish the 
inventor’s intellectual property from the surrounding terrain.”20 Legal 
commentators have postulated many theories on the ideal scope for 
patents21—particularly biotechnology patents, which have been in the 
limelight of this debate because of the particular importance of biomedical 
research to society.22 These theories are explored in detail below. 
A. PROSPECT THEORY 
Generally, “[p]rospect theory argues for broad patents because, by 
granting control of a technology, they ensure efficient coordination of 
innovation.”23 Edmund Kitch, who put forth this theory, relied on important 
features of the patent system in the development of his argument.24 First, 
patent claims are typically broader than what is described in the 
specification.25 Second, inventors are typically able to apply for patents 
“early in the development process.”26 This potentially allows inventions to 
be patented before they are commercially viable.27 Since the inventor need 
only disclose a device that works—and there are statutory bars in place that 
reward promptness—she is incentivized to file as quickly as possible.28 
While this process may seem counterintuitive, it arguably fulfills one of the 
                                                                                                                                
 16. Mull, supra note 6, at 396 (stressing that the written description requirement enhances 
innovation). 
 17. U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 8; Merges, supra note 1, at 808. 
 18. See Adelman, supra note 3, at 987. 
 19. Robert P. Merges & Richard R. Nelson, On the Complex Economics of Patent Scope, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 839, 843 (1990). 
 20. Id. at 844–45. 
 21. See Adelman, supra note 3, at 996. 
 22. David E. Adelman & Kathryn L. DeAngelis, Patent Metrics: The Mismeasure of 
Innovation in the Biotech Patent Debate, 85 TEX. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (2007). 
 23. Adelman, supra note 3, at 996. 
 24. Edmund W. Kitch, The Nature and Function of the Patent System, 20 J.L. & ECON. 265, 
267 (1977). 
 25. Id. at 268. 
 26. Id. at 269. 
 27. Id. at 270. 
 28. Id. at 267, 269–70 (“[T]here are rules, such as the priority, time-bar, and patentability 
rules, which force an early patent application whether or not something of value (and hence a 
reward) has been found.”). 
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vital roles of the patent system: to disclose what has been invented or 
discovered “so others have the benefit of the inventor’s discovery.”29 Kitch 
argued that these features allow the patent system to “increase the output 
from resources used for technological innovation.”30 Believing that a lack of 
competition was not a problem, and that “unification of control” was 
important,31 Kitch appeared to prefer “single-firm domination of a 
technological prospect.”32 
B. MERGES AND NELSON’S APPROACH 
Professors Robert Merges and Richard Nelson believed that 
competition should play an important role in the patent system and 
questioned the actual practical effects of unification of control.33 They 
emphasized that giving one firm complete control of a given technology 
would limit rivalry and result in diminished action in that technology’s 
further development.34 Additionally, they argued that “overly broad rights 
will preempt too many competitive development efforts.”35 However, they 
also realized that keeping patent claims “too narrow will not provide 
enough incentive to develop the asset.”36 Basing their argument on “faster is 
better,” Merges and Nelson theorized that there is probably some 
connection “between the speed with which innovations are introduced and 
the overall number of innovations.”37 The process by which innovations are 
created varies across industries, and licensing in some of these industries 
could mitigate the negative effects of broad patents.38 For example, the 
Cohen-Boyer patent, which covered a technique to insert a “gene into a host 
cell,” was licensed broadly,39 preventing any inaction in that technology’s 
development that might have resulted from only one firm having control 
over the technology.40 Notwithstanding the mitigation potentials, Merges 
and Nelson concluded that competition tends “to generate rapid progress 
and seems a much better social bet than a regime where only one or a few 
organizations control the development of any given technology.”41 
                                                                                                                                
 29. Merges, supra note 1, at 808. 
 30. Kitch, supra note 24, at 265. 
 31. Id. at 285. 
 32. Merges & Nelson, supra note 19, at 871–72. 
 33. Id. at 872. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. at 875. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. at 878. 
 38. Id. at 880, 883. 
 39. Id. at 906–07. A holder of a broad patent has the ability to prevent too many competitors 
from entering the field. Id. at 875. Therefore, a patentee willing to allow others to develop and 
improve the invention through licensing has the ability to substantially decrease the possible 
negative effects the broad patent may have on innovation. Id. at 907. 
 40. Id. at 872. 
 41. Id. at 908. 
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C. ANTICOMMONS AND BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH 
A criticism of the above competition model is that it ignores the 
possibility of the formation of an “anticommons.”42 Michael Heller and 
Rebecca Eisenberg worried that the patenting of biomedical research might 
have the unwanted effects of underutilizing scarce resources and limiting 
innovation.43 The concern is that if a plethora of patents was owned by too 
many universities or companies, they would serve as obstacles to future 
research instead of incentives to engage in risky but potentially rewarding 
research.44 Heller and Eisenberg claimed there “has been a spiral of 
overlapping patent claims in the hands of different owners, reaching ever 
further upstream in the course of biomedical research.”45 The development 
of specific products might require access to various patents, which, if held 
by too many competitors could increase transaction costs and unduly delay 
innovation.46 A possible unfortunate result of this patent labyrinth is that 
firms might decide to divert their resources to “less promising projects,” or 
those less beneficial to society.47 
However, a recent study looking at the biomedical research field 
determined that an anticommons has not emerged.48 Since public entities 
involved in promulgating discoveries largely control the “upstream” 
research, and certain categories of patents have limited “usefulness,” the 
“fenced in” research domain is much smaller than expected.49 The author 
argued that the National Institutes of Health (NIH) leads this public sector 
and engages in certain activities that prevent the formation of an 
anticommons.50 This agency “mandat[es] liberal licensing of any funded 
discoveries; foster[s] a critical mass of upstream innovators that private for-
profit firms dare not sue; and launch[es] initiatives that pre-empt potential 
anticommons-based business models, often by releasing discoveries and 
information into the public domain.”51 An example of NIH trying to foster 
innovation and prevent an anticommons from forming involves a method 
that creates knockout mice.52 DuPont developed a method of creating these 
                                                                                                                                
 42. Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The 
Anticommons in Biomedical Research, 280 SCI. 698, 698 (1998) (“[A] resource is prone to 
underuse in a ‘tragedy of the anticommons’ when multiple owners each have a right to exclude 
others from a scarce resource and no one has an effective privilege of use.”). 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 699. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Shiu, supra note 2, at 416. 
 49. Id. at 415–16. 
 50. Id. at 415. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 430. Knockout mice have had one or more of their genes modified to stop their 
expression. Id. 
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mice and licensed it for use in downstream research.53 However, these 
licensing agreements contained “reach-through” provisions that appeared to 
give DuPont ownership of downstream discoveries that depended on the 
knockout mice.54 NIH “persuaded DuPont to remove the reach-through 
provisions from its licensing agreement with all universities.”55 
D. BURK AND LEMLEY’S TECHNOLOGY-SPECIFIC APPROACH 
Realizing that patent law is applied differently across industries, Dan 
Burk and Mark Lemley pointed out that the various theories on patent scope 
might individually apply to one industry better than another.56 In 
biotechnology, for example, there are “thousands of patents on DNA 
sequences that cover specific genes or in some cases fragments of genes” 
and research in gene therapy that requires the use of multiple patents, which 
could lead to the formation of an anticommons.57 Additionally, the “reach-
through” licenses previously described have the potential to magnify the 
problem by further fragmenting rights and preventing downstream 
researchers from having complete control over their projects.58 However, in 
the pharmaceutical industry, the scopes of patents are pretty much 
“coextensive” with the drugs sold, creating a scenario aligned with prospect 
theory.59 The combined voluminous costs of research and development into 
each new drug and the regulatory oversight by the Food and Drug 
Administration create a need for strong patent protection that allows for 
broad patent claims.60 
The patent system also has “policy levers” in place “permit[ing] patent 
law to take account of the technology-specific nature of the patent 
system.”61 The written description requirement is an example of a policy 
lever that has been applied differently for software patents and 
biotechnology patents.62 These policy levers enable courts to influence 
patent scope. 
                                                                                                                                
 53. Id. (citation omitted). “Reach-through” provisions appear to give ownership rights of 
discoveries made as a result of the licenses to the licensor. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 431. 
 56. Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1595 
(2003). 
 57. Id. at 1625–26. 
 58. Id. at 1626. 
 59. Id. at 1617. 
 60. Id. at 1616. 
 61. Id. at 1630. 
 62. Id. at 1653–54. 
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E. ADELMAN’S APPROACH 
David Adelman argued that biotechnology patenting has not threatened 
biomedical innovation as much as other theorists have predicted.63 Legal 
commentators have failed to analyze “the interplay between the underlying 
science and patent policy,” and ignored the fact that biotechnology 
“research opportunities far exceed the capacities of the scientific 
community,” creating “an effectively unbounded, uncongested common 
resource.”64 Additionally, the underlying biomedical sciences are more 
complex than the media portrays, creating barriers to innovation.65 One of 
these barriers results from an attenuated connection between disease 
susceptibility and genes.66 This creates the need for “trial-and-error 
research” as “identifying useful drug targets and understanding the biology 
of diseases [is] challenging.”67 As a result, there are many approaches to 
treating diseases; the complexity of human biology diminishes the chance 
that a patent anticommons would form.68 
F. CONCLUSION 
The various economic theories on patent scope and its effect on 
innovation provide a much-needed background to a discussion on written 
description and enablement. While the scholars who put forth these theories 
might have reached different conclusions, they all stressed the importance 
of innovation as a goal of the patent system. This goal can be achieved by 
using the enablement requirement as a means to invalidate the broadest 
patents, and allowing corporations and universities to utilize their varying 
strategies to promote research and innovation.69 
II. BACKGROUND OF ENABLEMENT AND WRITTEN 
DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENTS—TWO CHECKS THAT 
AFFECT PATENT SCOPE 
The exhaustive literature regarding the effect of patent scope on 
innovation shows that some checks against broad claims are necessary. The 
disclosure requirement checks provided for in 35 U.S.C. § 112 limit “the 
exclusionary power conferred by a patent.”70 The statute requires that the 
specification . . . contain a written description of the invention, and of the 
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, 
and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it 
                                                                                                                                
 63. Adelman, supra note 3, at 986. 
 64. Id. at 986–87. 
 65. Id. at 1006, 1008. 
 66. Id. at 1008. 
 67. Id. at 1013. 
 68. Id. at 1014, 1018. 
 69. Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 322. 
 70. Gay & Spain, supra note 6, at 2. 
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pertains, or with which it is most nearly connected, to make and use the 
same . . . .71 
Courts have gleaned, in part, two requirements from this statutory 
language: “enablement” and “written description.”72 Together they “set 
forth what an inventor must give back to the public” in exchange for the 
exclusive rights of the patent.73 For enablement, the patentee must include a 
specification that “teach[es] those in the art to make and use the invention 
without undue experimentation.”74 For written description, “a patent 
specification must describe an invention and do so in sufficient detail that 
one skilled in the art can clearly conclude that ‘the inventor invented the 
claimed invention.’”75 This section analyses the enablement and written 
description requirements with an eye towards critical cases involving 
biotechnology patents. 
A. ENABLEMENT 
The enablement requirement was initially applied in cases involving 
biotechnology patents to “police broad claims.”76 Even though the patent 
has to include enough information “to enable one of ordinary skill in the art 
to make and use the invention . . . without undue experimentation,” the fact 
“[t]hat some experimentation is necessary does not constitute a lack of 
enablement.”77 Additionally, a patent need not necessarily disclose all 
“embodiments” of the invention.78 In the case In re Wands, the Federal 
Circuit considered eight factors in analyzing whether undue 
experimentation was necessary to make and use the invention.79 These 
factors are: 
(1) the quantity of experimentation necessary, (2) the amount of direction 
or guidance presented, (3) the presence or absence of working examples, 
(4) the nature of the invention, (5) the state of the prior art, (6) the relative 
skill of those in the art, (7) the predictability or unpredictability of the art, 
and (8) the breadth of the claims.80 
Later cases clarified that courts do not need to analyze “all the Wands 
factors to find a disclosure enabling.”81 
                                                                                                                                
 71. 35 U.S.C. §112 (2006). 
 72. See, e.g., Whitley, supra note 6, at 617. 
 73. Huang, supra note 6, at 5. 
 74. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 737 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (citations omitted). 
 75. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997) 
(citing Lockwood v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 76. Huang, supra note 6, at 6. 
 77. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 78. Huang, supra note 6, at 6. 
 79. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 737. 
 80. Id. (citation omitted). 
 81. Amgen, 927 F.2d at 1213. 
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In Wands, the Federal Circuit held that a patent claiming immunoassay 
methods “for the detection of hepatitis B surface antigen [HBsAg] by using 
high-affinity monoclonal antibodies of the IgM isotype” was not invalid for 
lack of an enabling description.82 This patent disclosed a procedure for 
producing sufficient amounts of antibodies by creating hybridomas from 
mice lymphocytes.83 These hybridomas secrete both IgG and IgM 
antibodies that bind to HBsAg, even though the method only calls for the 
IgM isotype.84 However, after analyzing the various hybridoma cell lines 
created, the patentees deposited a specific hybridoma cell line that was 
found to secrete the IgM antibodies.85 The court decided that undue 
experimentation was not needed to acquire the antibodies even though, out 
of the 143 high-binding hybridoma cell lines that were created, only four 
secreted IgM antibodies that had sufficiently high binding affinity to 
HBsAg.86 The patentees analyzed only nine of the hybridomas “beyond the 
initial screening for HBsAg binding,” and it is reasonable to conclude that 
some of the cell lines not tested produce IgM.87 Additionally, “[t]here was a 
high level of skill in the art at the time when the application was filed, and 
all of the methods needed to practice the invention were well known.”88 
People of ordinary skill in the art know that they need to analyze multiple 
cell lines before finding ones that secrete the desired antibody.89 
Unlike in Wands, the Federal Circuit in Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai 
Pharmaceuticals Co. found a patent invalid for lack of enablement.90 One 
of the patents at issue claimed “all possible DNA sequences that will 
encode any polypeptide having an amino acid sequence ‘sufficiently 
duplicative’ of EPO to possess the property of increasing production of red 
blood cells.”91 The court looked to whether the scope of the specification 
was coextensive with the scope of the claim and found that it was not.92 
Even though the specification need not disclose all embodiments of the 
invention, the patent at issue only disclosed the process of making EPO and 
                                                                                                                                
 82. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 733, 740. 
 83. Id. at 734. Hybridomas are created by fusing cancerous myeloma cells with lymphocytes. 
Id. The resulting hybrid cell can “divide and grow indefinitely in cell culture.” Id. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. This cell line “was deposited at the American Type Cultural Collection.” Id. Written 
disclosures are sometimes insufficient to enable the public to make and use the invention. Id. at 
735. When this is the case, one can comply “with the enablement requirement [by depositing] the 
living materials in cell depositories which will distribute samples to the public who wish to 
practice the invention after the patent issues.” Id. (citation omitted). 
 86. Id. at 738, 740. 
 87. Id. at 739. It is possible to extrapolate that some of the stored cells produce IgM because 4 
of the 9 hybridomas tested produce IgM. Id. 
 88. Id. at 740. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 91. Id. at 1203, 1212 (“Erythropoietin (EPO) is a protein . . . which stimulates the production 
of red blood cells.”). 
 92. Id. at 1214. 
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a few “analogs.”93 The number of potential EPO analogs greatly dwarfed 
the ones disclosed.94 Manipulating the nucleotide sequence that codes for 
EPO to change just one amino acid in the EPO protein can make “over 
3,600 different EPO analogs.”95 Additionally, “over a million different 
analogs can be made by substituting three amino acids.”96 Therefore, the 
patent did not disclose “enough sequences to justify grant of the claims 
sought.”97 
Wands and Amgen both provide a framework for how the Federal 
Circuit has used the enablement requirement to police broad patent claims. 
The Wands patent was upheld because it sufficiently disclosed enough 
information to allow a person of ordinary skill in the art to make and use the 
invention.98 On the other hand, the broad patent claims in Amgen were 
struck down because the possible analogs that fit within the claims 
overshadow the few disclosed in the specification.99 Therefore, enablement 
serves as a possible check on patent scope. 
B. THE WRITTEN DESCRIPTION REQUIREMENT 
The written description requirement was first used by courts to prevent 
patentees from amending their applications to include claims not supported 
by the written description in their original application, thereby preventing 
them from unfairly benefitting from the earlier filing date.100 However, the 
Federal Circuit later decided to use the requirement to limit broad claims in 
the original application as well.101 
In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., the court held that a 
patent’s specification did not sufficiently describe the cDNA claimed.102 
The broadest claim in the patent claimed “‘[a] recombinant plasmid [that 
contained] . . . within its nucleotide sequence a subsequence having the 
structure of the reverse transcript of an mRNA of a vertebrate, which 
mRNA encodes insulin.’”103 The patent also had separate claims for 
“recombinant prokaryotic microorganisms” that contained vertebrate, 
mammalian, and human insulin-encoding cDNA.104 Even though the 
patentee tried to claim insulin-encoding cDNA contained in recombinant 
                                                                                                                                
 93. Id. at 1213–14. 
 94. Id. at 1213. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 740 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
 99. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1213 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 100. Huang, supra note 6, at 7. 
 101. See id. at 10 (citing Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1562 
(Fed. Cir. 1997)). 
 102. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d at 1566. 
 103. Id. at 1563. 
 104. Id. 
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organisms in all species within the vertebrate and mammalian genera, the 
specification only disclosed a description of rat-insulin cDNA, and a 
method for obtaining the human insulin-encoding cDNA, “along with the 
amino acid sequences of human insulin.”105 Holding that “[a]n adequate 
written description of a DNA . . . ‘requires a precise definition, such as by 
structure, formula, chemical name, or physical properties,’” the court found 
the claims at issue were not adequately described.106 Though an adequate 
description of a genus does not require a description of every species in that 
genus, the nucleotide sequence of rat–insulin cDNA is not by itself a 
representative sample “of species within the genus.” 107 Additionally, “a 
method of preparing a cDNA or even describing the protein that the cDNA 
encodes . . . does not necessarily describe the cDNA itself.”108 
The next important case that ultimately narrowed the holding of Eli 
Lilly was Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe, Inc.109 In Enzo, the patent at 
issue claimed “nucleic acid probes that selectively hybridized” to DNA of 
N. gonorrhoeae over DNA of N. meningitidis at a ratio greater than five-to-
one.110 Enzo deposited three nucleic acid probes that “had a selective 
hybridization ratio of greater than fifty,” and the patent specifically 
referenced these deposited probes.111 In addition, the specification described 
“the binding affinity of the claimed nucleotide sequence.”112 However, the 
Federal Circuit initially held that a functional description alone is 
inadequate to fulfill the written description requirement because “it does not 
describe the [nucleic acid] probe itself.”113 Moreover, even though the 
deposited sequences might have conveyed possession, “possession alone is 
[not] always sufficient to meet that requirement.”114 Burdening the public 
by requiring them “to go to a public depository and perform experiments to 
                                                                                                                                
 105. Id. at 1567. 
 106. Id. at 1566–67. 
 107. Id. at 1568–69. 
A description of a genus of cDNAs may be achieved by means of a recitation of a 
representative number of cDNAs, defined by nucleotide sequence, falling within the 
scope of the genus or of a recitation of structural features common to the members of 
the genus, which features constitute a substantial portion of the genus. 
Id. 
 108. Id. at 1567. 
 109. See Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956 (Fed. Cir. 2002); Enzo 
Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo I), 285 F.3d 1013 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 110. Enzo I, 285 F.3d at 1015–16. N. gonorrhoeae is the bacteria that causes gonorrhea. Id. at 
1015. The detection of this bacterium has been difficult because nucleic acid probes that bind to it 
also generally bind to N. meningitidis, another bacteria. Id. 
 111. Id. at 1016. 
 112. Id. at 1017. 
 113. Id. at 1018. 
 114. Id. at 1020. 
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identify an invention is not consistent with the statutory requirement to 
describe one’s invention in the specification.”115 
After Enzo petitioned the Federal Circuit for rehearing, the court 
decided to “vacate the prior decision, and reverse the district court’s grant 
of summary judgment that Enzo’s claims are invalid for failure to meet the 
written description requirement.”116 In reaching this conclusion, the court 
held “that reference in the specification to a deposit in a public depository, 
which makes its contents accessible to the public when it is not otherwise 
available in written form, constitutes an adequate description of the 
deposited material sufficient to comply with the written description 
requirement of § 112, ¶ 1.”117 However, since the claims in the patent not 
only claimed the deposited nucleic acid probes, but also “subsequences and 
mutated variations” of them, the court reversed and remanded to allow a 
determination of “whether a person of skill in the art” would understand 
that the patentee “possessed” this material based on the description and 
“information obtainable from the deposits.”118 Furthermore, the Federal 
Circuit concluded that some functional descriptions are adequate for the 
written description requirement, and ruled that the lower court should 
determine “whether a reasonable fact-finder could conclude that the 
claimed sequences are described by their ability to hybridize to structures 
that, while not explicitly sequenced, are accessible to the public.”119 
The Federal Circuit again analyzed the written description requirement 
in University of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., a case involving a patent 
for methods of administering “a non-steroidal compound that selectively 
inhibits activity of the [COX-2] gene product to a human host in need of 
such treatment.”120 The patent did not disclose any compounds that might 
have this effect or even hypothesize how they might be produced or 
obtained.121 Furthermore, there was a lack of evidence showing that the 
inventors themselves knew of specific compounds that fit the description in 
the patent.122 Indeed, the district court even found that the claims at issue 
                                                                                                                                
 115. Id. at 1021. 
 116. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956, 960 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 117. Id. at 965. 
 118. Id. at 966. 
 119. Id. at 968. 
 120. Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 917–18 (Fed. Cir. 2004). COX-1 
and COX-2 are cyclooxygenases that are involved in various biological pathways in the human 
body. Id. at 917. COX-1 plays a role in protecting the stomach lining while “COX-2 is expressed 
in response to inflammatory stimuli.” Id. Scientists believe that aspirin, ibuprofen, and other 
“[t]raditional non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drugs” act by inhibiting these cyclooxygenases. Id. 
However, since these drugs inhibit both COX-1 and COX-2, they have the unfortunate side effect 
of causing stomach problems. Id. at 918. Therefore, University of Rochester scientists tried to 
develop a method of only inhibiting COX-2, instead of both enzymes. Id. 
 121. Id. at 919. 
 122. Id. 
2011] Immaterial to Innovation 515 
were not enabling.123 While the Federal Circuit did not consider the 
enablement issue on appeal, it did affirm the district court’s finding that the 
patent lacked an adequate written description.124 The patent did 
not provide any guidance that would steer the skilled practitioner toward 
compounds that can be used to carry out the claimed methods—an 
essential element of every claim of that patent—and has not provided 
evidence that any such compounds were otherwise within the knowledge 
of a person of ordinary skill in the art at the relevant time.125 
In essence, the disclosure only laid out a potential research plan for 
finding the necessary compounds and a potential function of the compounds 
in the event they were found.126 However, in reaching this conclusion, the 
court argued that the written description requirement has been recognized 
for a long time, in part because past cases invalidated claims that were 
broader than the disclosure.127 While this may be true, the Federal Circuit 
also invalidated broad claims that were not coextensive with the disclosures 
on enablement grounds.128 
C. CONFUSION SETS IN 
The written description requirement has been confusingly applied over 
the years.129 At first, Eli Lilly required a specific accounting of the 
invention’s scientific characteristics in order to satisfy the written 
description requirement.130 However, Enzo appeared to loosen this 
requirement, and held that some functional descriptions might satisfy 
written description.131 Additionally, references to a deposit in the 
specification are now sufficient.132 Rochester, on the other hand, “took a no-
drug, no patent approach.”133 Indeed, “[t]he court’s invention of a separate 
written description requirement has ‘create[d] confusion as to where the 
public and the courts should look to determine the scope of the patentee’s 
right to exclude.’”134 As a result, there had been uncertainty in how patent-
related business should be conducted.135 
                                                                                                                                
 123. Id. 
 124. Id. at 929–30. 
 125. Id. at 929 (citation omitted). 
 126. Id. at 926–27. 
 127. See id. at 923 (citing In re Moore, 155 F.2d 379, 382 (C.C.P.A. 1946)). 
 128. See Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 129. Chen, supra note 6, at 572. 
 130. See Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
 131. Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc. (Enzo II), 323 F.3d 956, 968 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
 132. Id. at 965. 
 133. Chen, supra note 6, at 572. 
 134. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (Linn, J., 
concurring) (citing Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 375 F.3d 1303, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(Linn, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)). 
 135. Id. 
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III. AN ANALYSIS OF THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RECENT 
DECISION—ARIAD PHARMACEUTICALS, INC. V. ELI 
LILLY & COMPANY 
Confusion over the written description requirement led the Federal 
Circuit to grant en banc review of whether written description is a separate 
requirement from enablement.136 This portion of the note will provide an in-
depth look at Ariad and why the patent at issue is not enabling. The analysis 
will demonstrate that enablement—on its own without an independent 
written description requirement—is a sufficiently effective check against 
the broadest patents. However, since the Federal Circuit held that the 
written description is a separate requirement, this note will also analyze the 
rehearing opinion and whether it clarifies how to apply the requirement. 
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
The patent at issue in Ariad involves a method for regulating the 
activity of the transcription factor NF-KB.137 While NF-KB is an essential 
molecule that plays a crucial role in activating genes that help combat 
deleterious extracellular influences, it also “can be harmful in excess.”138 
Realizing that reducing NF-KB activity might mitigate detrimental disease 
symptoms, the inventors filed a patent that claimed a method for “reducing 
NF-KB activity.”139 The specification of the patent only disclosed “three 
classes of molecules potentially capable of reducing NF-KB activity: 
specific inhibitors, dominantly interfering molecules, and decoy 
molecules.”140 After the patent was issued on June 25, 2002, the plaintiffs 
sued Eli Lilly for infringement, and the jury found the patent enabling with 
an adequate written description.141 Eli Lilly appealed.142 
B. THE MAJORITY OPINION AND THE CONCURRING OPINION 
The majority found that the claims at issue were invalid because the 
specification’s written description was inadequate.143 Central to this holding 
was the fact that Ariad did not disclose any molecule “capable of reducing 
NF-KB activity.”144 Even though Ariad only claimed the method of NF-KB 
reduction, the written description requirement is only satisfied with 
“adequate description of the molecules that Ariad admits are necessary to 
                                                                                                                                
 136. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 595 F.3d 1329, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
 137. Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1369–70. Transcription factors are molecules that regulate the 
expression of genes. Id. at 1369. 
 138. Id. at 1369. 
 139. Id. at 1370. 
 140. Id. at 1373. 
 141. Id. at 1369–70. 
 142. Id. at 1371. 
 143. Id. at 1380. 
 144. Id. at 1373. 
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perform the methods.”145 While Ariad did disclose three hypothetical 
classes of molecules that might have this desired effect, the overall 
specification was insufficient.146 Most of the information concerning the 
sole “specific inhibitor” example given was gleaned from a figure not 
disclosed until after the effective filing date of the application.147 Therefore, 
it could not “offer substantial evidence for the jury determination.”148 
Additionally, the rest of the evidence constituted “a vague functional 
description and an invitation for further research [which did] not constitute 
written disclosure of a specific inhibitor.”149 Moreover, the specification 
provided no examples of dominantly interfering molecules.150 Even though 
the third class of molecules—“decoy molecules”—was also posed 
hypothetically, the specification included examples of their structures via 
specific DNA sequences.151 While the court held that this disclosure was an 
adequate description of the decoy molecules, it also held that the 
specification did not “adequately describ[e the use of] those molecules to 
reduce NF-KB activity.”152 It concluded that the disclosure, which merely 
stated that NF-KB “would bind the decoy” and lead to “negative 
regulation,” did not provide a “descriptive link between the table of decoy 
molecules and reducing NF-KB activity.”153 Therefore, in light of the fact 
that “[t]he state of the art at the time of filing was primitive and uncertain,” 
the claims at issue were held invalid, “leaving Ariad with an insufficient 
supply of prior art knowledge with which to fill the gaping holes in its 
disclosure.”154 
In the concurring opinion, Judge Linn argued that there is no separate 
written description requirement.155 This additional requirement, Judge Linn 
continued, has had the unfortunate effect of creating confusion and 
uncertainty in the law.156 Moreover, the concurrence observed that deciding 
the case on written description grounds prevented the court from reviewing 
an important enablement issue.157 Ariad broadly claimed “any method for 
reducing NF-KB activity in cells, including both known and unknown 
methods.”158 Judge Linn mentioned that the court has not “addressed [the 
enablement] requirement in relation to the type of claims at issue here—that 
                                                                                                                                
 145. Id. at 1374. 
 146. Id. at 1374–76. 
 147. Id. at 1374. 
 148. Id. 
 149. Id. 
 150. Id. at 1375. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. 
 154. Id. at 1376. 
 155. Id. at 1381 (Linn, J., concurring). 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. 
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is, claims written broadly enough to cover any method for achieving a 
particular result.”159 Judge Linn concluded that these broad claims might be 
per se invalid because “the specification cannot enable unknown 
methods.”160 
C. THE COURT SHOULD HAVE DECIDED THE CASE ON ENABLEMENT 
GROUNDS 
Judge Linn made a valid point when arguing that Ariad’s broad method 
claims might be invalid for lack of enablement. Past Federal Circuit 
precedent clearly shows that the court has held similarly broad claims 
invalid for failing to enable. Because narrower claims have been struck 
down on enablement grounds and broad method claims are problematic,161 
the facts of Ariad suggest that the enablement requirement can serve as an 
effective check against the broadest patents. Moreover, if the written 
description requirement still serves a purpose, it is to limit claims that might 
happen to survive an enablement analysis. The Federal Circuit has made a 
habit of deciding cases on written description grounds without reaching an 
enablement analysis.162 Therefore, the Federal Circuit should not even reach 
an analysis of a patent’s written description until it decides whether a patent 
is enabling. However, even in the recent rehearing decision, the Federal 
Circuit failed to conduct an enablement analysis of the Ariad patent.163 
The Ariad patent does not include enough information “to enable one of 
ordinary skill in the art to make and use the invention . . . without undue 
experimentation.”164 While the patent in Amgen was struck down even 
though it sufficiently disclosed some embodiments of the invention,165 the 
patent in Ariad did not sufficiently disclose any embodiments of the 
claimed invention.166 Undue experimentation would be needed to find a 
way to make and use the invention because, of the three hypothetical 
classes of molecules posed, no molecules were disclosed as of the effective 
date of filing for two of the classes, and the method to use molecules of the 
third class was vague at best.167 Unlike the material in Wands,168 no 
                                                                                                                                
 159. Id. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. 
 162. See id.; Univ. of Rochester v. G.D. Searle & Co., 358 F.3d 916, 929–30 (Fed. Cir. 2004) 
(“In view of our affirmance of the district court’s decision on the written description ground, we 
consider the enablement issue to be moot and will not discuss it further.”); Regents of the Univ. of 
Cal. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 119 F.3d 1559, 1567 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Whether or not it provides an 
enabling disclosure, it does not provide a written description of the cDNA encoding human insulin 
. . . .”). 
 163. See discussion infra Part III.D. 
 164. Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200, 1212 (Fed. Cir. 1991). 
 165. Id. at 1213–14. 
 166. Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1376. 
 167. Id. at 1374–76. 
 168. See In re Wands, 858 F.2d 731, 734–35 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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molecules were deposited in Ariad. Lastly, the Federal Circuit in Ariad held 
that the “art at the time of filing” was nascent and untested,169 unlike the 
state of the art in Wands. In the latter case, the court held that the skill in the 
art as of the filing date was high enough so that the techniques required to 
utilize the invention were recognized in the field.170 Therefore, the Federal 
Circuit would also likely hold the claims at issue in Ariad invalid for lack of 
enablement. As a result, the enablement requirement as it stands now serves 
as an effective control measure for these broadest patents. 
 
D. THE REHEARING DECISION 
 
Even though the Federal Circuit decided to rehear Ariad, and even 
though enablement serves as an effective check against broad patents, the 
Federal Circuit ultimately decided that the written description is indeed a 
separate requirement.171 Relying, in part, on statutory interpretation, the 
court argued that “[i]f Congress had intended enablement to be the sole 
description requirement of § 112, first paragraph, the statute would have 
been written differently.”172 After it agreed that written description is a 
separate requirement, the court looked to how it should be applied. The 
court affirmed that the description in the specification “must ‘clearly allow 
persons of ordinary skill in the art to recognize that [the inventor] invented 
what is claimed.’”173 To satisfy this test, courts should determine “whether 
the disclosure of the application relied upon reasonably conveys to those 
skilled in the art that the inventor had possession of the claimed subject 
matter as of the filing date.”174  
However, the court admitted that “[t]he term ‘possession’ . . . has never 
been very enlightening.”175 In an attempt to clarify how “possession” should 
be interpreted, the court specified that the purpose of the written description 
requirement is disclosure.176 Therefore, the standard “requires an objective 
inquiry into the four corners of the specification from the perspective of a 
person of ordinary skill in the art.”177 This inquiry into possession is a 
question of fact, and so may vary depending on the facts of each case.178 As 
a result, the court declined “to predict and adjudicate all the factual 
scenarios to which the written description requirement could be applied.”179 
                                                                                                                                
 169. Ariad, 560 F.3d at 1376. 
 170. In re Wands, 858 F.2d at 740. 
 171. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d. 1336, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 172. Id. at 1344. 
 173. Id. at 1351 (quoting Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1991)). 
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It also refused to provide any bright line rules.180 Instead, it set out certain 
principles that have been applied in the past; for instance, the court 
reiterated that “a [mere] constructive reduction to practice that in a definite 
way identifies the claimed invention can satisfy the written description 
requirement.”181 Moreover, actual “possession” alone is insufficient because 
possession must be demonstrated by the specification.182 And, while the 
court admitted that “written description and enablement often rise and fall 
together,” it also argued that the written description requirement is needed 
for instances when claims cannot be described because they cannot be 
invented, but “do not require undue experimentation to make and use.”183 
Lastly, the court recited its precedent when describing how to apply the 
written description requirement.184 
With this decision, it has been argued that the Federal Circuit did not 
provide much direction in how the written description requirement should 
be applied.185 Indeed, for the most part, it simply rehashed prior precedent 
without clarification.  The decision, therefore, is likely to have less of an 
impact186 on the patent landscape than many had hoped or thought, 
especially as the court explicitly acknowledged that the written description 
and enablement requirements are generally either both met or not met 
together. Therefore universities and companies will, for the most part, draft 
successful patents even if they only follow enablement alone. However, 
their licensing and litigation strategies should help them adapt to the now 
concrete written description requirement as well. 
IV. UNIVERSITY AND CORPORATE STRATEGIES THAT LIMIT 
PATENT EFFECTS ON INNOVATION 
The fact that broad patents like the one in Ariad could be kept in check 
with the enablement requirement—and that universities and companies 
have developed strategies that effectively permit their continued 
research187—highlights the point that a heightened written description 
requirement is not a necessary control mechanism for innovation. However, 
even with this requirement, the strategies will prevent innovation from 
                                                                                                                                
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. at 1352 (citing Falko-Gunter Falkner v. Inglis, 448 F.3d 1357. 1366–67 (Fed. Cir. 
2006)). 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. at 1353. 
 185. Skaist, supra note 14. 
 186. Kevin E. Collins, An Initial Comment on Ariad: Written Description and the Baseline of 
Patent Protection for After-Arising Technology, 2010 PATENTLY-O PATENT L.J. 60, 61, available 
at http://www.patentlyo.com/files/collins.ariad.pdf. 
 187. Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 322. 
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being stymied.188 This section of the note analyzes some of these strategies 
and shows that many of the concerns over patents’ effect on innovation 
have not come to pass.189 Additionally, it will present examples of how 
these approaches attempt to resolve potential problems created by both 
broad and narrow patents. Lastly, the section will conclude with a 
suggestion for the best method of maintaining innovation in biomedical 
research. 
A recent study analyzed corporate and university strategies that have 
been used to limit the impediment of biomedical innovation by conducting 
“interviews with personnel at biotechnology and pharmaceutical firms and 
universities in considering the effects of research tool patents on industrial 
or academic biomedical research.”190 Research tools in this context “include 
any tangible or informational input into the process of discovering a drug or 
any other medical therapy or method of diagnosing disease.”191 The patent 
at issue in Ariad is an example of a research tool patent because it is for 
potential molecules “capable of reducing NF-KB activity.”192 The goal of 
reducing this transcription factor was to mitigate symptoms of diseases.193 
Therefore, the patent at issue in Ariad and others are relevant to this 
discussion. 
Two situations may occur in the biomedical field that could impede 
innovation. First, an anticommons may form in the biomedical field.194 As 
described earlier,195 an anticommons forms when there are “multiple patents 
covering different components of some product, its method of manufacture, 
or inputs into the process through which it is discovered.”196 However, 
biomedical research efforts may also be prevented and innovation impeded 
when there are instead relatively few patents on “key tool[s] or 
discover[ies].”197 When these broad patents are not shared, they “may limit 
the use of these discoveries in subsequent discovery and consequently limit 
the pace of innovation.”198 The Ariad patent is such a broad patent because 
it potentially includes all molecules that are capable of lowering NF-KB 
activity.199 However, even though Ariad is an example of a potentially 
                                                                                                                                
 188. Id. at 322–23 (asserting that many companies liberally and broadly license their patents in 
the belief that “by giving several firms a nonexclusive license they increase the chances that one 
will discover a useful drug”). 
 189. Id. at 324. 
 190. Id. at 287. The authors of this study conducted seventy interviews with various employees 
at firms and universities to determine the effect of patents on innovation. Id. 
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 192. Ariad Pharms., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 560 F.3d 1366, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 
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522 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. [Vol. 5 
problematic patent, there is evidence that innovation has not been stymied 
by the formation of an anticommons. 
There has been little to no evidence that an anticommons has formed.200 
While the amount of biotechnology patents increased rapidly from 1985 to 
2000, and with it the number of licenses needed for individual projects—
creating an ever-increasing complexity in the patent landscape—many 
researchers believe that the costs are manageable and worth the potential for 
“downstream discoveries.”201 First, there has been almost no “breakdown in 
negotiations over rights that lead to an R&D project’s cessation.”202 The 
majority of the time researchers were able to obtain the necessary patent 
rights for their projects through licensing.203 Second, even though hundreds 
of patents are typically considered for a biomedical project initially, 
relatively few—if any—of those will end up needing to be licensed.204 
While the resulting licensing fees might still be high, they usually result in a 
loss for research projects, and the potential for high royalty fees rarely stops 
such projects from continuing.205 The costs are considered to “be within 
reason largely because the productivity gains conferred by the licensed 
research tools were thought to be worth the price.”206 Additionally, these 
costs are often discounted for government and university researchers.207 
Therefore, while several narrow patents that cover a field may lead to 
higher licensing costs, innovation does not appear unreasonably impeded. 
Moreover, there does not seem to be an unchecked problem with 
exclusive licensing and broad patents.208 The concern, discussed earlier, “is 
that restrictive assertion or licensing of patents on research tools—
especially foundational upstream discoveries upon which subsequent 
research must build . . . may undermine the advance of biomedical 
research.”209 These research tools were originally placed in the public 
                                                                                                                                
 200. Walsh et al., supra note 15, at 297–305. 
 201. Id. at 293, 301. 2,000 biotechnology patents were issued in 1985, while over 13,000 have 
been issued in 2000. Id. at 293. 
 202. Id. at 298. 
 203. Id. (“Of the 55 respondents who addressed this issue . . . , 54 could not point to a specific 
project stopped because of difficulties in getting agreement from multiple IP owners.”). 
 204. Id. at 294. 
[Respondents] said that there may be a large number of patents to consider initially—
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Id. 
 205. Id. at 299–300. 
 206. Id. at 301. 
 207. Id. at 302 (“Celera, for example, licenses their databases to firms for about $5 million to 
$15 million per year and to university labs for about $7,500 to $15,000.”). 
 208. Id. at 322–23. 
 209. Id. at 296. 
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domain, but they recently have been patented more and more.210 However, 
while there are examples of cases where broadly interpreted patents on 
targets “prevent[ed] others from engaging in the subsequent development 
needed to bring the patented technology to market,” it appears to make 
economic sense to broadly license these patents.211 If these broad patents on 
targets are “exploited on an exclusive basis,” a social cost results that may 
be detrimental to firms.212 For example, various pharmaceutical firms have 
“libraries” of drugs that might affect the patented targets.213 These libraries 
are highly differentiated across the firms, so the odds of finding an ideal 
drug for the target increase with the availability of the license.214 However, 
the capabilities of the firms obviously depend on their size, and the 
strategies vary.215 Additionally, firms still complain about the patentees’ 
exclusive use of research tools—especially of “‘targets,’ which refers to any 
cell receptor, enzyme, or other protein implicated in a disease, thus 
representing a promising locus for drug intervention.”216 Notwithstanding 
the concerns regarding broad patents on research tools, “the problem was 
generally considered to be manageable” because “of private strategies and 
institutional responses that limited the adverse effects of the changing IP 
landscape.”217 
Two reasons innovation has not been unreasonably impeded in the 
biomedical field are the strategies developed by firms and universities and 
their ability to adapt. For one thing, it is relatively easy to contract and 
license out patents.218 Many companies have also decided to license targets 
liberally and broadly because it enhances the probability of discovering 
useful drugs.219 However, when licensing is not the optimal strategy, 
universities and firms can also “invent around” patents, ignore patents, 
create public databases, or challenge patents in court.220 Therefore, even 
with the written description requirement now firmly in place, universities 
and firms already have a portfolio of strategies to adapt and the ability to 
develop more. 
Firms and universities usually have the ability to “invent around” 
patents.221 This is even true in the face of broad patents on targets because, 
even in those cases, it is unlikely that they would “confer exclusive rights to 
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working on a disease.”222 Many diseases—including cancer, AIDS, and 
heart disease—are very complex and multiple proteins, multiple receptors, 
and multiple drugs might work and need to be tested.223 The Ariad patent, 
while overly broad, was only for molecules that inhibit NF-KB. There are 
likely other transcription factors that are involved in the expression of 
disease symptoms. Therefore, even the Ariad patent would have been 
unlikely to confer exclusive rights. Moreover, the enablement requirement 
is perfectly capable of limiting similarly broad patents without the written 
description requirement. 
If inventing around patents is not successful, another option is to ignore 
patents on upstream inventions and soldier on with the research without 
them.224 It is particularly hard to ascertain whether research tool patents are 
being infringed, so many firms and universities try their hand at remaining 
under the radar.225 Researchers, especially those at universities, “have a 
reputation for routinely ignoring IP rights in the course of their research.”226 
However, they are usually shielded from lawsuits because many firms do 
not want to enforce their patents against them.227 Damages are likely to be 
comparatively low and the probability of resultant bad publicity high.228 
Additionally, many firms want to develop and maintain friendly 
relationships with universities to promote the sharing of information.229 To 
encourage this trusting environment, firms sometimes give out research 
tools to universities for free.230 These universities, as a rule, also “do not 
assert their rights against one another.”231 The fact that firms do not 
typically enforce their rights against universities and sometimes “feel that it 
is not worth their while to assert their patents on all other firms that might 
be infringing,”232 shows that they might be taking strategic risks. “[In most 
instances] the cost of pursuing these cases greatly outweighs their value.”233 
Therefore, firms will now more likely tend to avoid lawsuits to prevent their 
patents from being held invalid for failure to have adequate written 
descriptions. 
The complex strategies utilized by universities and corporations, as 
shown, are more than enough to overcome the potentially additional burden 
of the written description requirement, especially since they already had to 
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adapt to this requirement in the past. Now that the written description 
requirement has been more firmly embedded into patent law, it will serve as 
merely one factor in an analysis of whether to use licensing or litigation as 
protective measures. Indeed, “[m]aximising the value of patents requires 
careful planning and continual diligence.”234 In order for universities and 
firms to effectively manage their patents, they need to carefully assess “the 
costs, risks and rewards of licensing and litigation options.”235 Some patents 
may not be worth litigation expenses, while others may not be right for 
licensing purposes.236  
Licensing might be the best strategy for patent owners because it is 
“generally less expensive then pursuing litigation” and “can also lead to 
significant market expansion and generate new sources of revenue for the 
patent owner through the business relationship.”237 Licensing is more 
predictable, and since it is cooperative in nature, it might enhance a 
business’ reputation more so than litigation.238 However, as licensing is, in a 
sense, a compromise, “the patent holder must cede some value of the 
patented technology to the licensee.”239 This is why litigation might 
occasionally prove a better strategy to enforce one’s patent rights. With 
litigation, a patent holder “seeks to maintain exclusive control, avoiding the 
risks of lost commercial exploitation or tarnishment of the property.”240 On 
the other hand, the significant costs and uncertainty make litigation a 
weaker strategy in many situations.241 Indeed, litigation could cost up to ten 
million dollars.242 Corporations and universities should rely on the Ariad 
rehearing when deciding on what strategy to utilize.   
CONCLUSION 
This note has discussed why innovation will be unaffected by the 
Federal Circuit’s decision to uphold the written description requirement. 
Corporations and universities already have several strategies in place to 
prevent innovation from being impeded, and these strategies help limit the 
fallout from anticommons formations, broad patents, and exclusive 
licensing.243 Furthermore, the enablement requirement already serves as an 
effective check on the broadest and most unfair patents, like the one in 
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Ariad. Therefore, the written description requirement will not have a 
significant impact on how universities and firms do business. If anything, it 
will only serve as one factor in an analysis of what strategies to utilize. 
Brian Kimmelblatt 
                                                                                                                                
   B.S., Cornell University, 2006; J.D. candidate, Brooklyn Law School, 2011. I would like 
to thank my family for their love and support. I would also like to thank Robert Marko, Steven 
Bentsianov, and the rest of the editors for their assistance in preparing this note for publication. 
